Beyond the Clouds: Safeguarding Our LEO Telecom Future from Cyber Sabotage

AI generated image of a satellite over Central America

ENISA’s recent report on the cybersecurity of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations providing telecommunications services (LEO satcom) summarizes various threats and risks (technical, financial, and commercial). The scope of potential attacks includes both common attack vectors and space segment specific types of attacks.

Common Attack Vectors

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communication (satcom) systems face a variety of cyber threats due to their increasing role in global communications, including internet connectivity, navigation, and military applications. The most common cyber threats faced by LEO satcom systems include:

  1. Eavesdropping: Unauthorized interception of satellite communications can lead to the compromise of sensitive information. This threat is particularly concerning for military and governmental communications, but it also affects commercial entities.
  2. Jamming: Intentional interference with satellite signals disrupts communications. Jamming can target the uplink (from ground to satellite), downlink (from satellite to ground), or both, causing denial of service to legitimate users.
  3. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks: These attacks involve overwhelming the satellite network’s resources by flooding it with malicious traffic, potentially from multiple compromised bots or systems. DDoS attacks can disrupt service for all users of a satellite network.
  4. Spoofing: This involves the creation of fake signals or data to deceive satellite systems or users. Spoofing can lead to the misdirection of communications or the provision of false information, with potentially dangerous consequences.
  5. Hijacking: Attackers may gain control of the satellite itself or its communication functions, allowing them to alter or disrupt operations. This could include changing the satellite’s course, shutting down communications, or using the satellite to broadcast malicious data.
  6. Software Vulnerabilities: Like any other computer system, satellites and their ground stations can have software vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to gain unauthorized access or disrupt services. These vulnerabilities can arise from outdated software, insufficient security protocols, or flaws in new software deployments.
  7. Supply Chain Attacks: Attackers may target suppliers or components of the satellite communication system to compromise the security of the entire network. This can include tampering with software or hardware before it is launched into orbit.
  8. Physical Attacks on Ground Stations: While not purely cyber in nature, attacks on the physical infrastructure supporting satellite communications, such as ground stations, can have significant cyber implications by disrupting control and data flows.

Space Segment Specific Attacks

The satellite-specific attacks outlined in the report include classic attacks targeting user/control segments and attacks on the satellites themselves, known as the space segment. Major past incidents highlighted in the report involve data theft through reverse engineering of user links and denial of service attacks on both ground and space segments. The report emphasizes the unique cybersecurity challenges faced by LEO satcom systems, such as payload hijacking and platform hijacking, due to their global assets, higher financial risks, and the nature of the threats.

The cybersecurity landscape for LEO satcom systems is complex and requires a multifaceted approach to defense, including encryption, secure protocols, regular software updates, and vigilance against emerging threats.

author avatar
Jane Ginn CTIN President & Co-Founder
Jane Ginn ~ As the co-founder of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Network (CTIN), a consultancy with partners in Europe, Ms. Ginn has been pivotal in the development of the STIX international standard for modeling and sharing threat intelligence. She currently serves as the Secretary of the OASIS Threat Actor Context Technical Committee, contributing to the creation of a semantic technology ontology for cyber threat actor analysis. Her efforts in this area and her earlier work with the Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) TC earned her the 2020 Distinguished Contributor award from OASIS. In public service, she advised five Secretaries of the US Department of Commerce on international trade issues from 1994 to 2001 and served on the Washington District Export Council for five years. In the EU, she was an appointed member of the European Union's ENISA Threat Landscape Stakeholders' Group for four years. A world traveler and amateur photojournalist, she has visited over 50 countries, further enriching her global outlook and professional insights. Follow me on LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/comm/mynetwork/discovery-see-all?usecase=PEOPLE_FOLLOWS&followMember=janeginn
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